aru Posted March 25, 2003 Report Share Posted March 25, 2003 MandrakeSoft Security Advisory MDKSA-2003:035 : openssl March 25th, 2003 Updated openssl packages fix RSA-related insecurities Researchers discovered a timing-based attack on RSA keys that OpenSSL is generally vulnerable to, unless RSA blinding is enabled. Patches from the OpenSSL team have been applied to turn RSA blinding on by default. An extension of the "Bleichenbacher attack" on RSA with PKS #1 v1.5 padding as used in SSL 3.0 and TSL 1.0 was also created by Czech cryptologists Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, and Tomas Rosa. This attack requires the attacker to open millions of SSL/TLS connections to the server they are attacking. This is done because the server's behaviour when faced with specially crafted RSA ciphertexts can reveal information that would in effect allow the attacker to perform a single RSA private key operation on a ciphertext of their choice, using the server's RSA key. Despite this, the server's RSA key is not compromised at any time. Patches from the OpenSSL team modify SSL/TLS server behaviour to avoid this vulnerability. The released versions of Mandrake GNU/Linux affected are: 7.2 [*] 8.0 [*] 8.0/PPC [*] 8.1 [*] 8.1/IA64 [*] 8.2 [*] 8.2/PPC [*] 9.0 [*] 9.1 [*] 9.1/PPC [*] Single Network Firewall 7.2 [*] Multi Network Firewall 8.2 [*] Corporate Server 2.1 Full information about this advisory, including the updated packages, is available at: www.mandrakesecure.net/en/advisories/advisory.php?name=MDKSA-2003:035 Other references are: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?n...e=CAN-2003-0147 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?n...e=CAN-2003-0131 http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/ http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts...ssl-timing.html Posted automatically by aru (mdksec2mub v0.0.4) Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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